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This Article considers the possibility of imposing liability in torts for a wrongfully
created risk of future harm. We examine the American and English court decisions
pertaining to this issue and consider whether a probability-based compensation for
the victim’s expected—albeit not yet materialized—harm is just and efficient. We
demonstrate how the virtues of a legal regime that allows a tort victim to recover
compensation for her expected harm overshadow its vices. We conclude that a
person’s risk of sustaining harm in the future should be actionable whenever the
risk is substantial. We further conclude that it should be left to the victim to decide
whether to recover for his or her expected harm, or else wait and see if the risk
materializes and recover only if it does. We observe that allowing victims to make
this choice might create a collective action problem. Because expedited
compensation for a victim’s expected harm erodes the wrongdoer’s ability to
compensate future claimants, victims would opt for an early recovery for expected
harm even when their substantive remedial preferences are different. We
demonstrate, however, that this problem can be resolved.
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Introduction
The House of Lords and the United States Supreme Court have
recently addressed the issue of liability for a risk of future illness.
This issue arose in connection with employees wrongfully exposed
by their employers to asbestos. As a result of this wrongful exposure,
the employees exhibited symptoms indicating an increased risk of
developing fatal cancer diseases in the future. Both decisions have
assumed as a common ground that this risk per se is not actionable in
torts. 1 This presupposition moved the focus of the Law Lords’ and
the Justices’ attention from real harm to the ethereal damage. The
issue adjudicated in both instances was whether the plaintiffs’ are
1

This assumption is more explicit in the British than in the American decision. See
below.
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entitled to recover from their employers compensation for the mental
anguish caused by the fear of developing cancer.
The American case, Norfolk & Western Railway Company v. Ayres, 2
involved railroad workers who sued their employer under the Federal
Employers Liability Act. The suit attributed to the defendant liability
for emotional distress suffered by the plaintiffs as a consequence of
contracting asbestosis. Each plaintiff contracted this disease
following his exposure to an impermissibly hazardous quantity of
asbestos, for which the defendant was unquestionably responsible.
The plaintiffs’ emotional distress (fear and anxiety) originated from a
worrying statistical fact: about ten percent of the people in a medical
condition similar to theirs develop mesothelioma—a fatal cancerous
disease—at some point in the future. The Supreme Court’s narrow
(5-4) majority decision allowed recovery to plaintiffs whose distress
was proven to be “genuine and serious.” Note again that recovery
was allowed not for the increased risk of contracting cancer, but
rather for the plaintiffs’ fear of becoming afflicted in the future. The
Court’s decision relied on both policy and doctrine. As a policy
matter, the Court underscored the problematics of the two-disease
requirement that the defendant asked it to interpose: this requirement
would deny compensation to an asbestosis sufferer who never
develops cancer. As a result, this sufferer’s fear of contracting cancer
at some point in the future—an undeniably harmful consequence of
the defendant’s wrongdoing—would never be actionable in torts. As
far as doctrine is concerned, courts across the United States have long
recognized a tort victim’s right to sue for any serious emotional harm
resulting from her present physical injury. Any such harm is part of
the victim’s “pain and suffering.” This parasitic actionability is a
deeply rooted common law principle. Allowing the plaintiffs to
recover compensation for their asbestosis-induced fear therefore does
not break away from the common law tradition.
The dissenters’ objection to this decision alluded (inter alia) to its
socially deleterious consequences. According to the dissent, the
Court’s compensatory generosity might drain the funds available for
compensating real asbestos victims for their physical injuries. These
2

Norfolk & Western Railway Company v. Ayres 538 U.S. 135 (2003) (hereinafter:
“Ayers”).
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injuries—held the dissent—are more immediate and more serious
than the disruption of the plaintiffs’ peace of mind.
The British case, Johnston v. NEI International Combustion Ltd, 3
involved plaintiffs who developed pleural plaques (fibrous thickening
of pleural membranes surrounding the lungs). Pleural plaques are
generally benign. Nor do they cause any asbestos-related diseases.
Those plaques, however, indicate the presence of asbestos fibers in
the person’s lungs and pleura. Asbestos, in turn, may independently
cause a cancerous disease—a grim prospect upon which the plaintiffs
based their suit. According to the plaintiffs, anxiety and emotional
distress associated with this prospect constitute compensable harm.
The House of Lords disagreed. It held that a risk of future illness and
the attendant anxiety are not actionable in torts as a stand-alone harm.
The Law Lords clarified, however, that the parasitic actionability
doctrine will still allow recovery in appropriate cases. That is, a
person who sustains compensable injury can recover damages for the
fear that the injury will develop into a more serious harm in the
future. This factor makes Johnston the doctrinal equivalent of Ayres.
The two decisions, however, are not completely identical to each
other. Ayres contains no express pronouncement on whether a risk of
future harm can ever become actionable as a stand-alone damage. 4
Johnston, in contrast, holds unequivocally that such risks are not
actionable in torts. The Law Lords’ adherence to the parasitic
actionability doctrine was unambiguous and unqualified. 5
In the pages ahead, we conduct a normative exploration of this issue.
We examine the desirability of a rule that imposes negligence-based
liability for a risk of future illness even when there is no any physical
harm in the present. Our desirability criteria are efficiency and
justice. Based on these criteria, we articulate the reasons for making a
stand-alone risk of future illness actionable in torts. We argue that a
3

Johnston v. NEI International Combustion Ltd [2007] UKHL 39 (hereinafter:
“Johnston”).
4
See Ayres, above n 2, at 153 (Justice Ginsburg opinion): ‘But the asbestosis
claimants did not seek, and the trial court did not allow, discrete damages for their
increased risk of future cancer.’
5
Johnston, above n 3, at 10, 17, 32, 38, 40-41.
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person wrongfully exposed to such risk should be entitled to
probabilistic compensation that matches his prospect of becoming ill.
This compensation should equal the harm resulting from the illness
multiplied by the illness’s probability.
After demonstrating the efficiency and justice of this proposal, we
discuss counterarguments. We first consider the objections to the
probabilistic recovery rule as applying in cases of indeterminate
causation. Those cases involve physical injury that may or may not
have been caused by the defendant’s negligence (“past-injury
cases”). We show that arguments against probabilistic recovery in
past-injury cases do not hold with respect to risks of future injury.
We then discuss two additional objections to our proposal. One of
them holds that small risks of future illness should not be actionable:
allowing people sue for such risks would be more costly than
beneficial. We agree with this point and limit our proposal to suits
involving substantial risk of illness.
A much stronger objection to our proposal identifies a serious
problem of collective action. Our proposal would allow tort victims
to choose between immediate compensation for the risk of future
illness and the “wait and see” strategy. Victims who choose to wait
and see would either become ill or avoid the illness. Victims who
ultimately avoid the illness would not be able to sue the defendant.
The remaining ill victims would become eligible to full
compensation for the harm suffered. Alas, those victims’ ability to
recover compensation would depend on the defendant’s solvency. If
the defendant becomes insolvent, it would not compensate those
victims. The defendant’s prospect of remaining solvent would
crucially depend on the victims’ initial choice. If many victims
choose to recover the immediate probability-based compensation, the
defendant’s funds may shrink to a degree that will deny
compensation to wait-and-seers. Every victim would anticipate this
contingency. The victims, however, would not be able to coordinate
their suits because the required coordination is too costly to establish
and enforce. Absence of coordination and the diluted-fund prospect
would prompt all victims to opt for the instant probability-based
recovery.
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This problem is real. We believe, however, that it can be resolved by
courts or through governmental intervention and offer two such
solutions.
Structurally, our argument unfolds in three parts. In Part I, we carry
out a comparative analysis of Ayres and Johnston. In Part II, we
analyze the virtues and vices of probabilistic recovery in past-injury
cases (also identifiable as cases of indeterminate causation) and relate
this analysis to the future illness problem. In Part III, we make out
the case for making risks of future illness actionable in torts and
develop a number of suggestions on how to operationalize this
proposal. A short conclusion follows.

I. Ayres v. Johnston
A. Ayres
In Ayres, 6 the United States Supreme Court addressed the question of
whether an employee wrongfully exposed to asbestos at work is
entitled to recover from his employer compensation for the fear of
developing cancer. The plaintiffs suffered from asbestosis caused by
a work-related excessive exposure to asbestos. About ten percent of
the people suffering from this disease develop fatal cancer. Five
Justices allowed recovery for the plaintiffs’ fear. Specifically, they
affirmed the plaintiffs’ recoveries for pain and suffering—mostly
fear-related 7 —ranging from $500,000 to $1,200,000. 8 The dissent
opined that no such recovery should be allowed.
Justice Ginsburg, writing for the Court, held that mental anguish
resulting from a person’s fear of developing cancer in the future is
compensable under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act 9 as part of a
successful plaintiff’s entitlement to compensation for pain and
6

Ayres, above n 2.
Justice Kennedy emphasized that the plaintiffs have sustained no significant
harm other than this fear. See Ayres, above n 2, at 179-180.
8
The lower recovery amounts were awarded to smokers due to their comparative
negligence. Ayres, above n 2, at 179..
9
Federal Employers’ Liability Act 45 U.S.C.S. § 51 et seq.
7
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suffering. 10 She set two cumulative conditions for a plaintiff’s
eligibility for this compensation. First, the plaintiff must prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that his fear is genuine and serious. 11
Second, the plaintiff must preponderantly establish that this fear
results from an illness for which the defendant is responsible. 12
Justice Kennedy spoke for the dissent. According to him, the
plaintiffs’ suits are causatively weak. First, the alleged fears cannot
be considered a direct consequence of the plaintiffs’ disease.13
Second, there is no dependable scientific proof of the causal nexus
between the plaintiffs’ disease and cancer. 14 Third, the alleged harms
are speculative and quantitatively insignificant, given the presence of
a significant asbestos-unrelated risk of contracting cancer (for
smokers, in particular). 15 Justice Kennedy also alluded to social
policy. According to him, making bare fears of cancer compensable
would exhaust the financial resources that defendants could use for
compensating asbestos victims who actually develop cancer. 16
Justice Breyer took a middle-ground approach. He agreed with the
Court that a tort victim’s fear of a future illness should be actionable
when it is genuine, serious, and originates from a proven disease.
Yet, according to him, compensation for such fear should be
generally unavailable when the following conditions are present:
(1) actual development of the disease can neither be
expected nor ruled out for many years;
(2) fear of the disease is separately compensable if the
disease occurs; and
10

Ayres, above n 2.
Ayres, above n 2, at 157. Another issue was whether damages should be
apportioned among multiple tortfeasors in a way that would allow the defendant to
reduce its compensation duty to the plaintiff. The Justices have reached a
unanimous opinion that the Federal Employers’ Liability Act allows no such
apportionment, ibid, at 159-166, but the defendants could still bring
‘indemnification and contribution actions against third parties under otherwise
applicable state or federal law.’ Ibid, at 162.
12
Ayres, above n 2, at p 157.
13
Ayres, above n 2, at 171-172.
14
Ayres, above n 2, at 173
15
Ayres, above n 2, at 179.
16
Ayres, above n 2, at pp. 168-169.
11
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(3) fear of the disease is based upon risks not
significantly different in kind from the background
risks that all individuals face. 17

Justice Breyer clarified that these compensation-denying rules are not
meant to be rigid:
‘This is not to say that fear of cancer is never
reimbursable. The conditions above may not hold. Even
when they do, I would, consistent with the sense of the
common law, permit recovery where the fear of cancer is
unusually severe – where it significantly and detrimentally
affects the plaintiff’s ability to carry on with everyday life
and work.’ 18

B. Johnston
In Johnston, as in Ayres, the plaintiffs were exposed to excessive
quantities of asbestos by their employers. The plaintiffs, however,
contracted no recognizable diseases (with the exception of one
plaintiff who developed clinical depression). Instead, they developed
pleural plaques—a condition not amounting to a physical impairment
or disablement. Not being a disease, pleural plaques indicate the
presence of asbestos fibers in the person’s lungs. This contamination
puts the person at risk of developing cancer in the future. 19
This risk may instill in the person fear of death and related anxieties.
Alternatively, it may exacerbate a person’s preexisting fear and
anxiety. The plaintiffs in Johnston have developed such anxieties.
The House of Lords consequently had to decide whether this mental
and emotional anguish constitutes compensable damage under the
negligence doctrine. 20
The Law Lords decided that it does not. This holding was both
categorical and unanimous (it also extended to the plaintiff with a
17

Ayres, above n 2, at 187.
Ibid.
19
As attested in Johnston, above n 3, at para 80, ‘The Claimant is at risk of future
development of asbestosis (1%), diffuse pleural thickening (1%) and mesothelioma
(5%) and as a result suffers anxiety for his future health and welfare.’
20
The Law Lords parenthetically mentioned the possibility of a contract-based
action, but made no decision on that matter since it was not argued by the plaintiffs.
Johnston, above n 3, at paras 59, 74.
18
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fully-blown depression). The Law Lords dismissed the plaintiffs’
argument that a combination of non-actionable plaques, a nonactionable risk of illness and a non-actionable anxiety constitutes
actionable harm. 21 As Lord Scott explained, this argument fails
‘because [n]aught plus naught plus naught equals naught.’ 22 The Law
Lords clarified, however, that presence of an actionable injury—
asbestosis being an example—would make the attendant anxiety
actionable as well. 23

C. Ayres, Johnston, and Liability for Future Harms
We now attempt to extrapolate the two courts’ attitude toward
liability for a wrongfully imposed risk of illness. We leave behind the
anxiety-related causes of action and focus instead on the risk of
illness as compensable harm. We distinguish, as the courts did,
between two scenarios. In the first scenario, the risk of illness
originates from the plaintiff’s actionable injury, for which the
defendant is responsible. In the second, the plaintiff sustains no
actionable injury and sues the defendant for the risk of harm as a
stand-alone damage.
Under the first scenario, the Law Lords in Johnston would impose
liability for the risk. As Lord Scott explained:
‘[I]t is common ground that if some physical injury has
been caused by the negligence, so that a tortious cause of
action has accrued to the victim, the victim can recover
damages not simply for his injury in its present state but
also for the risk that the injury may worsen in the future
…’ 24

Ayres did not address this issue.
Under the second scenario, the Law Lords in Johnston would impose
no liability whatsoever. As already indicated, they held unanimously
that a stand-alone risk of future harm does not constitute actionable
21

Johnston, above n 3, at para 89.
Ibid, at para 73.
23
Ibid, at para 67.
24
Ibid.
22
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harm. 25 The Ayres decision did not address this issue expressly, 26 but
it seems that also American Law would preclude liability for a standalone risk of future illness.

II. Past Harm
A. Paradigmatic Cases
The problem of indeterminate causation arises when the defendant
may or may not be the cause of the harm wrongfully inflicted on the
plaintiff. 27 In the next few paragraphs, we present the paradigmatic
cases in which this problem arises.
Consider a case in which several wrongdoers, acting independently
of each other, negligently expose the plaintiff to a risk of sustaining
harm. The plaintiff consequently faces several independent risks of
sustaining harm. One of those risks materializes and the plaintiff
suffers harm. This harm was brought about by one of the
wrongdoers, whose identity is unknown.
In this type of cases—labeled “unidentifiable wrongdoer”—both
English and American courts allowed recovery. They held that the
wrongdoers are jointly and severally liable for the plaintiff’s
damage. 28 As an alternative to this remedy, courts could have
awarded prorated recovery: an award that equals the plaintiff’s harm
multiplied by each defendant’s probability of being the cause of the
harm (the “probabilistic recovery principle,” or PRP, for short).
25

See above Part I.A.
See above n 4 and accompanying text.
27
In other cases that we discussed elsewhere, the defendant caused part of the
plaintiff’s harm, but the exact amount of that part could not be established. See
Ariel Porat & Alex Stein, Tort Liability Under Uncertainty (Oxford, Oxford
University Press, 2001) 76-83, 201-6; Ariel Porat & Alex Stein, ‘Indeterminate
Causation and Apportionment of Damages: An Essay on Holtby, Allen and
Fairchild’ (2003) 23 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 667.
28
Fairchild et al v. Glenhaven Funeral Services Ltd et al. [2002] 3 WLR 89 (HL);
Summers v. Tice (1948) 199 P. 2d 1 (Cal. 1948). Some American courts awarded
this remedy even against defendants whose negligence was unproven. See, for
example, Ybarra v. Spangard 154 P. 2d 687 (Cal. 1944). This decision, however, is
an outlier.
26
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Courts, however, almost uniformly declined to adopt PRP in
“unidentifiable wrongdoer” cases. 29 This policy cannot be explained
by the judges’ mistrust of mathematical probabilities, because they
do something very similar to applying PRP when they apportion
damages among jointly liable tortfeasors (and also between
tortfeasors and their victims). The decision to reject PRP and hold
wrongdoers jointly and severally liable for the victim’s entire damage
is best explained by the courts’ desire to afford the victim maximal
protection against wrongdoers’ insolvency.
Another paradigmatic case features a wrongful risk-creator and a
natural cause as two mutually exclusive explanations for the victim’s
injury. Neither of these causal explanations can be confirmed or ruled
out. Consider a doctor who negligently misdiagnosed a patient,
thereby reducing the patient’s chances to recover. The patient
ultimately did not recover, but this outcome is attributable to his
preexisting medical condition for which the doctor is not responsible.
Arguably, because of this condition, the patient would not have
recovered even if the doctor diagnosed him properly. Assume that the
probability of this argument, raised by the doctor, is 50% or higher,
which means that the patient is unable to establish his causal
allegation against the doctor by a preponderance of the evidence. We
identify cases exhibiting these characteristics as “lost chance” cases.
Under the traditional “winner takes all” approach, to which English
courts adhere in such cases, 30 the patient would recover no
compensation whatsoever. Under PRP, in contrast, the patient would
recover compensation that equals his harm multiplied by the
probability of the causal claim that attributes this harm to the doctor’s
29

The main American exception is the “Market Share Liability” doctrine: see
Sindell v. Abbott 607 P. 2d 924 (Cal. 1980); Hymovitz v. Eli Lilly Co 539 N.E. 2d
1069 (N.Y. 1989); and see text accompanying notes ___. The House of Lords
applied PRP in a case where the harm to the plaintiff was the result of either a
wrongful exposure to asbestos caused by his employer or of a non-wrongful
exposure that occurred when the plaintiff was self-employed. See Barker v Corus
UK Ltd [2006] 2 AC 572 (HL). The legislature, however, intervened specifically in
order to reverse this ruling and enacted the Compensation Act 2006 (c. 29). This
Act only applies to asbestos-related diseases.
30
See Hotson v East Berkshire Area Health Authority [1987] 2 All ER 909; Gregg
v Scott [2005] 2 AC 176 (HL).
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negligence. In the United States, several courts have taken this route,
while others have refused to do so. 31 In a recent decision, the House
of Lords considered the adoption of PRP for “lost chance“ cases, but
decided against it by a 3-2 majority.32
Another illustrative case involves a group of employees suffering
from a disease that can be equally attributed to the employees’
predisposition to develop the disease and to their exposure to
asbestos wrongfully caused by their employer. While it can be
established by a preponderance of the evidence that a certain
percentage of the employees—typically less than 50% of them—
suffering from the disease contacted it because of the wrongful
exposure to asbestos, it cannot be established who those employees
are. We define cases falling into this category as “unidentifiable
victim” cases. Under the traditional “winner takes all” approach that
applies in England and in the United States, the court must dismiss
all employees’ suits against their employer. Under PRP, the
employer must compensate all employees for the harm they suffered
multiplied by the probability of the claim that the harm was caused
by the employer’s wrongdoing. 33

B. The Vices of Probabilistic Recovery
PRP offers an attractive solution to the problem of indeterminate
causation that arises in past-injury cases. Under this principle,
victims recover partial compensation for their possibly wrongful
injuries and wrongdoers pay for their misdeeds rather than go scotfree. On many occasions, PRP is preferable from an efficiency
perspective because it promotes optimal deterrence of wrongdoers.
The principle is also appealing as a retributive device because
wrongdoers are required to pay for their wrongs even in the absence
31

For applications of PRP see Herskovits v. Group Health Cooperative of Puget
Sound 664 P. 2d 474 (Wash 1983). For other approaches taken by American courts,
see Porat & Stein, Tort Liability Under Uncertainty, above n 27 at 73-76.
32
Gregg v Scott, above n 30.
33
Porat & Stein, Tort Liability Under Uncertainty, above n 27 at 70-73, 193-195.
See Barker v Corus, above n 29. Even though this case deals with a bit different
scenario, it may signal the emergence of a different approach to PRP in general,
and, specifically, to the principle’s application to “unidentifiable victim” cases.
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of a clear-cut causal nexus between those wrongs and the victims’
harms (some theorists do not consider harm a sine qua non
prerequisite of liability 34 ).
These virtues, however, come accompanied with a number of vices
that some consider fatal. One of those vices, which we discuss first,
is epistemological. All others are (interchangeably) operational and
moral.
As a factual matter, in each of the aforementioned cases, the
defendant had either caused the plaintiff’s entire harm or no harm at
all. The defendant certainly did not cause part of the harm.
Consequently, all decisions that PRP prompts courts to deliver would
be factually incorrect. This comprehensive incorrectness is a serious
epistemological vice that also creates tensions with corrective
justice. 35
Application of PRP would also present moral and operational
hurdles. Courts would have to make complicated determinations of
probabilities, instead of deciding cases on a “more probable than not”
basis. That would increase litigation costs. In addition, PRP would
allow courts to hold defendants liable on the basis of naked statistics.
This liability format is contentious from a moral point of view. 36
Relatedly, PRP authorizes courts to impose liability for bare risks.
This authorization is morally problematic as well: it clashes with the
34

See C.H. Schroeder ‘Corrective Justice & Liability for Increasing Risks’ (1990)
37 UCLA Law Review 439. For a retributivist account of harm as a pre-requisite for
tort liability, see Jeremy Waldron, ‘Moments of Carelessness and Massive Loss’ in
David G. Owen (ed), Philosophical Foundations of Tort Law (Oxford, Clarendon
Press, 1995) 387.
35
See S.R. Perry, Risk, ‘Harm, and Responsibility’, in David G. Owen (ed),
Philosophical Foundations of Tort Law (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1995) 321. But
see M. Stauch, 'Causation, Risk, and Loss of Chance in Medical Negligence’
(1997) 17 Oxford Journal Legal Studies 205, 217-218, for the claim that ruling
according to chances in past-injury cases is not contrary to the deterministic
causation approach, since such a ruling does not make any claim about the state of
the world, but, rather, about the state of our knowledge about the world. For a
different view, see H. Reece, ‘Losses of Chances in the Law’ (1996) 59 Modern
Law Review 188.
36
Charles R. Nesson, ‘Reasonable Doubt and Permissive Inferences: The Value of
Complexity’ (1979) 92 Harvard Law Review 1187, 1225.
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deeply entrenched moral intuition that considers the actual infliction
of harm to be a prerequisite for imposing liability in torts.37
According to this intuition, pure endangerment cannot be a reason for
holding its creator liable.
From the deterrence perspective, PRP might be operationally
redundant, as the “winner takes all” rule works fine in deterring
wrongdoers across cases. Under this rule, suits that are not
preponderantly probable fail completely. This failure erodes
deterrence because some (and possibly many) of the failed suits are
meritorious. The “winner takes all” rule, however, also provides that
suits with a probability greater than 0.5 are unqualified winners.
Plaintiffs recover full compensation even when their claims are only
slightly more probable than not. This provision increases the
expected amount of compensation for prospective wrongdoers and
compensates for the erosion of deterrence on the other side.
Furthermore, PRP breaks away from the minimal proof
requirement—preponderance of the evidence—set by the law as a
condition for authorizing courts to extract payments from defendants.
This requirement is far from technical: it derives from a more general
principle of evenhandedness that limits the courts’ power to force
transfers of money and property from one individual to another.
Under this principle, a court must not order such a transfer unless the
reasons for forcing it out are better than the reasons for preserving the
status quo. In the domain of fact-finding, the required “better
reasons” must be present in the probability of the plaintiff’s case.
When the plaintiff’s claims are not more probable than the
defendant’s, the court has no reasons for changing the status quo. 38

C. Refinements
In this section, we outline a number of refinements in the conditions
for applying PRP. Those refinements help identify cases in which the
principle’s vices fade away, partially or even completely. These cases

37

Perry, above n 35.
Alex Stein, Foundations of Evidence Law (Oxford, Oxford University Press,
2005) at 219-25.

38
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call for PRP’s application because the principle’s attractiveness is no
longer offset by its vices
One refinement is a temporal distinction between two different
categories of cases. Both categories involve causal indeterminacy.
One of those categories accommodates cases in which the
indeterminacy related to a past occurrence and was present all the
time. Cases falling into another category are different. In those cases,
causal indeterminacy attaches to a hypothetical or future event that
can be characterized as a past occurrence only at a later point in
time. 39 This distinction eliminates the epistemological vice. Consider
a wrongdoing that has just been perpetrated and assume that the
prospective victim did not yet suffer the harm associated with that
wrongdoing. At this point in time, the prospective victim can only
complain about his wrongful exposure to a risk of sustaining the
harm. His future prospects became blurred (or more blurred than
previously) due to the unwelcome imposition of the new risk of
harm. The wrongdoing thus made the victim’s future prospects less
desirable and, consequently, less valuable than before. 40 Note that
this assessment of the victim’s ex ante situation will remain
unmodified even if at a later stage he sustains the anticipated harm
without being able to associate it with the wrongdoing. The
worsened-prospect description of the prospective victim’s situation is
therefore empirically correct for the point in time at which the
wrongdoing took place.
Compare this scenario with a different setup, in which the plaintiff
suffers harm immediately after the defendant’s wrongdoing. Assume
that the probability of the allegation that the defendant’s wrongdoing
caused the harm is 0.5 or less, and that the plaintiff consequently
cannot establish that the defendant caused his harm. This setup
features no exposure-to-risk point along its timeline. There is no
point in time (save for points in time that are completely artificial) at
which the value of the plaintiff’s future prospects decreases. The
worsened-prospect description therefore does not fit this setup. As a
39

The House of Lords analyzed this distinction in Gregg v Scott, above n 30, at
181-183, without determining its implications.
40
See below Part III for further discussion of cases where the victim’s future is
blurred with uncertainty at the time of the trial.
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result, any verdict other than no-liability or full-liability would be
empirically unfounded. This “all or nothing” setup is present in a
case in which an obstetrician negligently induces labor and the baby
he delivers dies. Assume that the baby’s death could result from the
obstetrician’s negligence, or, alternatively, from the acute respiratory
problem which could not have been overcome even if the obstetrician
had taken due care. In this scenario, there was no point of time at
which the baby’s prospects of survival decreased by less than 100%.
Those prospects were either unaffected or completely eliminated by
the obstetrician’s negligence.
Another important refinement of PRP relies on a differentiation
between shortages of evidence. In some cases, courts need scientific
information about causation, but this information is not available. In
other cases, courts do not have enough case-specific evidence for
deciding the case. In the first category of cases, causal indeterminacy
is uniformly present in the fact-pattern of every case. In the second
category, it presents itself uniquely in each individual case. 41
Applying PRP in the first category of cases is more straightforward
than in the second. When the uncertainty problem is general, some
wrongdoers systematically escape liability. This happens when the
probability of causation is 50% or less and plaintiffs are
systematically denied remedies under the preponderance standard.
This effect is present in unidentifiable-wrongdoer cases, in
unidentifiable-victim cases, and in many of the lost-chance cases. In
those cases, the redundancy objection to PRP does not hold. Under
the “winner takes all” rule, all defendants—many of whom
wrongfully damaged their plaintiffs—are held not liable. This
outcome is both unjust and inefficient. To avoid this outcome, the
legal system needs to implement PRP. This need makes PRP crucial
rather than redundant.
For similar reasons, one cannot easily object to PRP by alluding to
the problematics of naked statistical evidence. When uncertainty is
present in every case and case-specific evidence is systematically
scarce, adherence to the rule against naked statistics is a logical
equivalent of a rule that absolves all defendants—many of whom are
41

See Gregg v Scott, above n 31, at 184.
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wrongdoers—from liability in torts. Adoption of PRP is the only
plausible way to avoid this unjust and inefficient result.
When causal indeterminacy is recurrent in a well-defined category of
cases, litigation costs triggered by the PRP are far from being crucial.
Indeed, under PRP, courts would have to deal with mathematical
probabilities and rely on experts more often than under the extant
regime. Courts, however, would also develop expertise and amass
information about causes, effects and probabilities. These knowledge
and expertise would be applicable in many cases. This economy of
scale would partially offset the increase in litigation costs. More
crucially, in cases where uncertainty systematically allows
wrongdoers in a specific field to escape liability, the inefficiency that
PRP’s adoption would avert outweighs any foreseeable increase in
litigation cost.
Last, the torts system needs to pay special attention to cases in which
the same wrongdoer recurrently causes harm. These cases are
qualitatively different from those featuring wrongdoing as a unique
or sporadic event. This distinction is important because in cases
falling into the recurrent wrongdoer category, virtually none of the
objections to PRP is valid. Consider the well-known case of DES, a
drug designed to prevent miscarriages that was manufactured by
hundreds of companies, mainly in the ‘50s and turned out to be
latently carcinogenic to female fetuses. Twenty-five years later,
numerous young women whose mothers had taken the drug were
diagnosed with uterine cancer. It was found by the courts that the
drug had not been tested adequately prior to its marketing and that
the manufacturers had failed to take into account certain findings that
had pointed to a risk of carcinogenic effect. Furthermore, the
plaintiffs’ mothers had never been cautioned against this risk.
Finally, the drug had been marketed under a generic rather than brand
name, which foiled attempts to trace each pill back to its actual
manufacturer. 42 For the purpose of providing a remedy to the
victims, courts developed the Market Share Liability doctrine (MSL).
Under this doctrine, first adopted by the California Supreme Court in
Sindell, 43 every defendant manufacturer was to assume liability for
42
43

See Sindell v. Abbott, 607 P.2d 924 (Cal. 1980).
Ibid.
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the plaintiff’s harm unless it could prove (by a preponderance of the
evidence) that it did not manufacture the drug taken by the plaintiff’s
mother. As the Sindell court clarified, this liability had to be imposed
only on those manufacturers who produced a substantial proportion
of DES in the relevant market. The court ultimately decided that the
burden of compensating each plaintiff for her damage would be
allocated amongst the manufacturers in accordance with their
respective shares in the DES market. 44
In the DES cases, recovery was probabilistic: the market share of
each defendant substituted for the probability that the litigated harm
was caused by that defendant. But since for each defendant the
wrongdoing was a recurring event, in the long run, MSL made each
defendant liable for the harm it actually caused. Indeed, each
defendant was obligated to compensate other defendants’ victims, but
at the end of the day, after all claims have been satisfied, the final
outcome was the same as in a case featuring no causal indeterminacy
whatsoever. 45
The DES scenario is far from being the only case in which PRP
would make the wrongdoers internalize the harm they actually
caused. Unidentifiable-victim cases often exhibit the same
characteristic. Take the asbestos case discussed above, in which
many employees were negligently exposed to asbestos by the same
employer. In this case, PRP would make the employer pay money
damages that correspond to the harm it caused. This socially
desirable effect will be achieved by allowing a compensatory
distortion. Because each of the injuries was either caused in its
entirety by the employer’s wrongdoing or by a natural cause, none of
the employees will receive compensation for the harm wrongfully
inflicted upon him or her. But this distortion is not a serious problem.
Under any plausible criterion of justice and efficiency, allowing each
employee to recover partial compensation while holding the
44

This decision can be understood as imposing liability on each defendant for all of
the plaintiff’s damage (in which case, equitable apportionment of the compensation
burden could be achieved through wrongdoers’ indemnification claims against each
other) or, alternatively, as imposing liability on each defendant for a prorated part
of that damage. See Brown v Superior Court, 751 P.2d 470, 485-487 (Cal. 1988)
(adopting the second interpretation of Sindell).
45
We assume that none of the defendants becomes insolvent.
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employer liable for the harm it wrongfully caused is better than
leaving all employees uncompensated and letting the employer go
scot-free.
All the objections to PRP fade away when the principle is applied to
recurrent-wrongdoer cases. The epistemological objection vanishes
because wrongdoers eventually pay for the harms they actually cause.
Moreover, in many (but not all) cases, victims of torts are
compensated for their actual harms (DES cases are the prime
example of this category of cases). The objection alluding to the
minimum proof threshold weakens as well because there would be no
significant departures from the proof requirements that ordinarily
apply in civil cases. Under PRP, the plaintiff must prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that the defendant committed a
recurrent wrongdoing. The plaintiff also must preponderantly
establish the approximate amount of the aggregate harm resulting
from the defendant’s wrongdoing. Arguments criticizing PRP for
establishing liability for bare risks become inapplicable, too. In cases
involving recurrent wrongdoers, defendants would not be paying for
bare risks. Rather, they would pay for the harms they actually caused.
Finally, when recurring-wrongdoer cases systematically feature
probability of causation of less than 50%, and case-specific evidence
is scarce, also the naked statistics, the redundancy and the litigation
costs objections lose most of their power.
The table below summarizes the applicability of the different
objections to PRP:
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Type of Uncertainty

Frequency of Wrongs

Past

Future/
Hypothetical

Case
Specific

Inherent

Discrete

Recurrent

Epistemological
Problem

A

N/A

A

A

A

N/A

Litigation Costs

A

A

A

N/A

A

N/A

Naked Statistics

A

A

A

N/A

A

N/A

Liability for Bare
Risk

A

A

A

A

A

N/A

Redundancy

A

A

A

N/A

A

N/A

Minimum
Threshold

A

A

A

A

A

N/A

A = applicable.
N/A = non-applicable.

D. Quantum of Damages
In the paragraphs below, we distinguish between two types of
probability-based compensation:
1. forward-looking compensation for the risk
of future injury; and
2. backward-looking compensation, based on
the probability of causation. 46
Take a person who sustains injury after being wrongfully exposed to
a risk of sustaining that injury. Before the wrongdoing, this victim’s
probability of sustaining the injury equaled 1-p (e.g., 0.25), which is
46

This discussion is based on Porat & Stein, ‘Indeterminate Causation’, above n 27
at 685-688.
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parallel to her probability of remaining uninjured (p) (i.e., 0.75).
After the wrongdoing, the victim’s probability of sustaining the
injury became 1-q (e.g., 0.75), which parallels her probability of
escaping the injury (q) (i.e., 0.25). Because the victim actually
sustained the injury, her case falls into the 1-q category (i.e., the 0.75
category). This statistical category comprises two jointly exhaustive
and mutually exclusive scenarios that reflect the victim’s initial
position. In the first scenario, the victim sustains the injury
irrespective of the wrongdoing. Under this scenario, the victim was
doomed to sustain the injury, so that the wrongdoing made no impact
on her well-being. As already indicated, the probability of that
scenario equals 1-p (i.e., 0.25). In the second scenario, it is the
wrongdoing that causes the victim’s injury. Under this scenario, the
victim would have remained uninjured had she not been exposed to
the wrongdoing. The probability of this scenario equals (1-q)-(1-p),
that is, p-q (i.e., 0.50). This ex ante probability represents the
reduction in the victim’s chances of remaining uninjured, as effected
by the wrongdoing.
Now consider the probability of the scenario that the wrongdoing was
the actual cause of the victim’s injury. This probability is represented
by the fraction of scenarios featuring a victim who could not sustain
her injury without being subjected to a wrongdoing in the more
general cluster of cases that feature an injured victim, a wrongdoing,
and the exhaustive variety of causal factors that could inflict the same
injury on the victim. The above fraction of scenarios equals p-q (i.e.,
0.50). The cluster of cases covering all possible scenarios equals 1-q
(i.e., 0.75). The ex post probability of the scenario in which the
wrongdoing actually inflicts the victim’s injury therefore equals (pq)/(1-q) (that is, 0.50 / 0.75 = 2/3).
As we already mentioned, the victim’s risk of sustaining injury as a
result of the wrongdoing equals p-q (i.e., 0.50). So long as the victim
lives under the risk of becoming injured, his expected damage
therefore equals (p-q)D (i.e., D/2), when D denotes the average
amount of harm suffered by similarly situated victims. This expected
damage is what the victim facing the risk of injury or illness should
recover from the wrongdoer.
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Victims who actually become ill should be compensated differently.
Using the same notation and the same numerical example as before,
let p (i.e., 0.75) and q (i.e., 0.25) denote, respectively, the victim’s
chances of remaining uninjured before and after the wrongdoing.
Allow D to denote the average amount of damage that the
wrongdoing inflicts in the long run of cases, and let T denote the total
number of cases in which the tortious activity takes place. The ideal
compensation that the legal system should exact from the wrongdoer
would thus equal (p-q)DT (i.e., DT/2).
In reality, however, only injured victims can successfully sue the
wrongdoer. Therefore, the number of cases in which the wrongdoer
would have to pay compensation would equal (1-q)T (i.e., 0.75T). If
the wrongdoer compensates each injured victim at the amount of (pq)D (i.e., D/2), then the wrongdoer’s compensation duty would fall
below the optimal. Using the probability of causation as an awardmultiplier would eliminate this shortfall. As already established, the
probability of causation equals (p-q)/(1-q) (i.e., 2/3). Each injured
victim’s compensation would consequently be set at [(p-q)/(1-q)]D
(i.e., 2/3·D). The total amount of the wrongdoer’s compensation duty
would then be [(p-q)/(1-q)]DT(1-q), that is: (p-q)DT (i.e., DT/2).
This compensation duty equals the losses inflicted by the
wrongdoer. 47
American courts tend to conflate the two types of compensation by
awarding injured victims the risk-based, rather than probabilitybased, amounts. 48 The draft of the RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW THIRD,
47

Note that when the probability of causation is greater than 0.5, the court may
decide to apply the “winner takes all” rule and award the plaintiff full
compensation.
48
For examples of this mistaken approach in the United States, see, for example,
Wendland v Sparks, 574 N.W.2d 327, 333 (Iowa 1998) (an oft-cited decision
analogizing the value of lost chances to that of a lottery ticket); Mays v United
States (1985, DC Colo) 608 F. Supp. 1476, revd on other grounds (CA10 Colo)
806 F.2d 976, cert den 482 US 913 (upon finding that malpractice reduced the
patient’s chances of recovery from 40 to 15 per cent, the court reasoned that the
damage related to net pecuniary loss caused by the medical centre was 25 per cent
of the $173,200 total net pecuniary loss, or $43,300); Herskovits v Group Health
Cooperative of Puget Sound 664 P.2d 474 (Wash. 1983) (holding a 14% reduction,
from 39% to 25%, in the decedent’s chance for survival as sufficient evidence to
allow the case to go to the jury); Alberts v Schultz, 975 P.2d 1279, 1287 (N.M.
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TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM (Proposed Final Draft No. 1)

proposes to fix this error by differentiating, as we do, between the
two types of awards. 49

III. Future Harms
In numerous cases in which one person acts wrongfully towards
another, the prospective victim faces a continuous risk of illness that
may or may not materialize in the future. Employees are exposed to
the risk of contracting an occupational disease due to unsafe working
conditions; residents of a polluted neighborhood face the risk of
becoming ill as a result of their exposure to pollution; consumers of
defective products have a prospect of contracting diseases from those
products; victims of medical malpractice face the risk of developing
an affliction or handicap; and there are many other examples.
Should faulty creators of such risks assume liability in torts for the
ensuing prospect of future illness?
This question is puzzling. Why not wait and see what happens in the
end? If the risk materializes into harm, its creator should then be
obligated to compensate the victim; and if the victim remains
unharmed, he should receive no compensation at all. Note that
1999) (if medical malpractice reduced the patient’s chance of recovery from fifty to
twenty percent, that patient’s compensation would be equal to thirty percent of the
value of his or her life); Jorgenson v Vener, 616 N.W.2d 366, 372 (S.D. 2000) (if
instead of completely eliminating the chance of recovery, the physician’s
negligence merely reduced the chance of recovery from 40% to 20%, then the
value of the lost chance would be 20% of the value of a complete recovery); Smith
v Washington 734 N.E,2d 548 (Ind. 2000) (affirming an award of 50% of the
patient’s damage upon finding that the defendant’s malpractice increased the
patient’s risk of incurring an already likely injury from 50% to 100%). For reasons
provided above, the claimant should have recovered 29 per cent of the damage in
Mays; 19 per cent of the damage in Herskovits; 37.5 per cent of the damage in the
Alberts example; and 25 per cent of the damage in the Jorgenson example. In
Smith, the outcome was correct because the defendant’s malpractice totally
eliminated the claimant’s chances of recovery. Otherwise, the court’s adherence to
the lottery analogy would have generated an error (as it did in our previous
examples).
49
See RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW THIRD, TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM §
26 cmt n, (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, April 6, 2005).
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statutes of limitations would not deny compensation to victims who
ultimately sustain harm because those victims’ causes of action
accrue only after the occurrence of the harm. 50 The repose provisions,
in contrast, would yield a different result. These provisions render all
suits non-actionable after a specified post-transgression period. The
fact that the victim’s harm had developed only after the statutory
deadline is immaterial. This fact can toll a limitations period, but not
a statute of repose because repose provisions have a special goal: to
reduce the volume of litigation by denying actionability to suits in
which the defendant’s wrongdoing and the plaintiff’s harm are
separated by a long period of time. 51 This policy purposefully
extinguishes all suits alleging deferred illness (or other latent
injuries) that are filed after the expiration of the repose period.
Whether prospective victims should be allowed to bypass this policy
by suing wrongdoers for their prospects of illness consequently
becomes a big question. This question concerns the limits that the
law should impose upon suits for future harm, while our goal here is
to determine whether such suits should ever be allowed to proceed.
We therefore leave this question open.
The Law Lords in Johnston have upheld the rule that allows
compensation for a future illness that might develop from the
plaintiff’s present injury, for which the defendant is responsible. 52
The prospect of future illness can thus be perceived as attaching to
the present injury and becoming part of the plaintiff’s present
physical condition. Alternatively, this prospect instills in the plaintiff
fear and anxiety that attach to his present pain and suffering. In both
cases, the prospect’s attachment is a legal move that creates a fusion
between the plaintiff’s present condition and future possibilities.
This move is artificial because in the empirical world no attachment
actually occurs. Theoretically (and more than just theoretically), even
with a present injury, the court could tell the plaintiff “Wait and see
what, if anything, happens with your risk. If it materializes, come and
see us; and if not then not.”

50

See, e.g., Baird v. American Medical Optics, 713 A.2d 1019 (N.J. 1998).
See, e.g., Rudenauer v. Zafiropoulos, 445 Mass. 353 (2005).
52
Johnston, above n 3 at para 67.
51
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But why not abandon the artificial devices that operate in this area of
the law? Why not allow a tort victim to recover compensation not
only for the risks attaching to her existing injury but also for a freestanding risk of future illness? We now turn to discussing this
question.

A. The Case for Liability
The case for making risks of future illness actionable in torts is
straightforward. A person’s prospect of becoming seriously ill erodes
his well-being. Consider two people who happen to be equal in all
respects except one: one of those people has a prospect of developing
a serious illness in the future, while the other has no such prospect.
The second person’s well-being outscores the well-being of the first
person (if forced to live one of those people’s lives, a rational
individual would prefer to be the second person rather than the first).
Assume now, that the first person did not come upon this misfortune
by himself. His prospect of becoming seriously ill resulted from
exposure to a toxic substance by a negligent wrongdoer. We argue
that under such circumstances, the law should allow the prospective
victim to choose between immediate recovery of compensation for
his expected harm and a postponed entitlement to recover full
compensation in the event of illness (for the sake of simplicity, our
ensuing discussion assumes that once the illness develops, the court
can verify with sufficient certainty that it was caused by the
wrongdoing).
The victim should be able to recover from the wrongdoer
compensation for the wrongfully imposed risk. The amount of this
compensation equals the harm associated with the illness multiplied
by the victim’s probability of becoming ill due to the wrongdoing.
That amount typically represents the victim’s increased cost in
purchasing health or life insurance due to his or her wrongful
exposure to the risk. After paying this compensation to the victim,
the wrongdoer will become immune from further liability. If the
victim’s ultimately becomes ill, he would not be allowed to collect
from the wrongdoer the difference between the expected and the
actual harm. Alternatively, the victim should be able to wait and see
whether he actually becomes ill. If he becomes ill, the wrongdoer
would have to fully compensate him for the harm suffered. If the
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victim develops no illness, however, the wrongdoer would pay
nothing.
The victim should be allowed to choose between these remedies for a
number of reasons. From the wrongdoer’s perspective, the two
remedies are economically identical. Therefore, he has no legitimate
reasons to oppose their substitution by one another. Assume that the
wrongdoer exposed ten victims to a 10% risk of sustaining physical
harm in the amount of $1,000,000. Regardless of whether victims
recover immediate compensation for their expected harm or are
compensated in the future, if and when their harm materializes, the
wrongdoer’s expected liability would be the same: $1,000,000.
Equally important, this liability also reflects the wrongdoing’s social
cost. Indeed, under our proposal, each victim would choose between
immediate compensation in the amount of $100,000 and future
compensation in the amount of $1,000,000, if harm materializes. This
choice would not change the wrongdoer’s expected liability.
Yet, it might change the wrongdoer’s liability de facto. To illustrate,
assume that nine victims out of ten recover $100,000 each, while the
tenth victim who chooses to wait and see. Subsequently, this victim
sustains the harm and recovers $1,000,000. In this scenario, the
wrongdoer ends up paying 1.9 million dollars rather than one million.
But that possibility should not bother us. If our proposal is adopted,
the insurance market would allow the risk-averse wrongdoer to
insure against the risk of paying the ninth victim $1,000,000. The
cost of this insurance would be around $100,000. 53
As we already explained, the wrongdoer has no legitimate reasons
upon which to base a claim that those two remedies are not identical
to each other. The wrongdoer, for example, cannot invoke its
hypothetical prospect of becoming insolvent in the future as a reason
for not compensating the victim for his presently expected harm. Nor
can the wrongdoer benefit from the victim’s prospective inability to
furnish evidence (typically, a long time after the wrongdoing’s
occurrence) that would causally relate his illness to the toxic
exposure (given the presence of competing causes to which the
53

We thank Lord Hoffman for raising this issue when our paper was presented at
the Aberdeen University symposium on causation.
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victim would be exposed before suing). The wrongdoer also should
not be allowed to take advantage of the victim’s prospect of
becoming fatally ill—a condition that may extinguish the victim’s
ability and motivation to wage a legal battle.
All those prospects entail a risk of injustice for the victim: they
indicate that denial of the victims’ right to be compensated in the
present for the risk of future harm may erode their entitlement to
compensation if and when their physical harm materializes. Those
prospects also dilute deterrence: wrongdoers expecting to undercompensate their victims in the future will be inefficiently underdeterred. The erosion-of-compensation prospect thus does not merely
offset the wrongdoer’s complaint about being held liable for bare
risk. This prospect is an affirmative reason for imposing such
liability.
The proposed liability system would bring about additional social
benefits. First, when the future harm is a fatal disease, expedited
compensation would allow victims to use the money they get during
their lifetime. 54 Second, some victims might be able to use their
expedited compensation towards mitigation of the risk of harm. For
example, a victim might be able to undergo extensive medical tests
and obtain preventive treatments that reduce her prospect of illness.
Victims would also be able to change places of residence, work and
lifestyles. Finally, some of the victims would also be able to purchase
life and medical insurance. The cost of this insurance would increase
as a result of the wrongdoing—yet another independent reason to
have the wrongdoer pay for it. 55
54

For an argument in the same vein, in another context, see David Friedman,
‘What is “fair compensation” for death or injury?’ (1982) 2 International Review of
Law and Economics 81.
55
Even under a regime that imposes no liability for future harms, courts should
allow recovery for money and efforts expended by victims on reducing such risks.
For principles governing such awards, see Mark Geistfeld, ‘The Analytics of Duty:
Medical Monitoring and Related Forms of Economic Loss’ (2002) 88 Virginia Law
Review 1921, 1940-1949; Kenneth S. Abraham, ‘Liability for Medical Monitoring
and the Problem of Limits’, (2002) 88 Virginia Law Review 1975; John C.P.
Goldberg & Benjamin Zipursky, ‘Unrealized Torts’, (2002) 88 Virginia Law
Review 1626. Furthermore, even when a tort victim sustains no physical injury,
courts should allow her to recover compensation for fear of future illness and for
the increased cost of her health and life insurance. See Porat & Stein, Tort Liability
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B. Objections
We now return to the objections raised against PRP as applied to
past-injury cases. We consider the validity of those objections in the
present context and find them unpersuasive. Subsequently, we
consider some additional—more powerful—objections to our
proposal.
The epistemic objection to probabilistic recovery falls apart once it is
recognized—as an empirical matter—that a person’s risk of
becoming ill in the future erodes her well-being. This erosion is selfevident: risk of illness is an unquestionably unwanted condition.
Indeed, it is epistemically rational for a person to buy insurance
against such risks or to avoid them by paying a steep price (for
example, by exercising and eating healthy, but untasty, food). The
relationship between risk of future harm and people’s well-being in
the present is straightforward when the risk is for future property
harm. In this case, the present market value of the property will be
discounted by the risk of harm even the risk is below 50%. For
example, if a wrongdoer created a 30% risk that the victim’s house
will collapse in the future, this risk would certainly reduce the
house’s market value. Admittedly, this analogy is far from perfect
because, unlike real property and commodities, life and limb are not
tradable. Yet, as we have demonstrated, risks to a person’s life and
health constitute detraction from her well-being. Those risks bring
into the person’s life deleterious economic and non-economic
consequences.
Litigation costs do not present a serious problem either. These costs
should be considered money well spent, given the benefits that the
proposed system would yield. Courts would also be able to reduce
those costs by relying on information generated by the market for
health and life insurance. Based on this information and expert
testimony, courts should be able to evaluate risks and damages both
adequately and expediently.
Courts also should not be reluctant to base wrongdoers’ liability for
future illnesses upon naked statistical evidence. This evidence is
Under Uncertainty, above n 27 at 121.
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often the only proof that the plaintiff can furnish. Her inability to
adduce case-specific evidence is hardly a good reason for allowing
the defendant to go scot-free, especially when the defendant’s
wrongdoing is recurrent.
The objection against liability for bare risks is equally unpersuasive.
We do not discuss here the pros and cons of a legal regime that
imposes liability for risks, as opposed to harms. We have done it
elsewhere. 56 As a general matter, arguments against liability for bare
risks lose much of their validity when there is uncertainty as to
whether the plaintiff was or will be harmed by the defendant’s
wrongdoing. 57 Furthermore, as we already explained, in cases
involving risk of future harm, the plaintiff would normally be able to
establish that this risk already constitutes harm for him or her.
The redundancy objection to our proposal would insist that a
prospective victim should wait and see whether she actually becomes
ill. As we already explained, however, there are good reasons for
allowing the victim to choose between immediate recovery of
compensation for her expected harm and the “wait and see” option.
Allowing the wrongdoer to dictate this choice to the victim would
defeat justice and efficiency at once. Actionability of future illnesses
thus cannot be considered redundant.
Finally, the minimum-threshold objection should not bother us at all.
Under our system, risk of future illness would be actionable as a
matter of substantive law. To succeed in an action for such risk, the
plaintiff would have to prove its nature and extent by a
preponderance of the evidence. The plaintiff would also have to
preponderantly establish that the risk originated from the defendant’s
wrongful action. The conventional principles of proof would thus
stay intact.
Typically (albeit not always), the uncertainty as to whether the
plaintiff will develop illness in the future is inherent in the entire
category of cases, as opposed to being present due to the absence of
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case-specific evidence. As we explained above, 58 in such cases, the
objections to PRP fade away. Furthermore, as we have shown in
relation to past-injury cases, 59 the recurrent character of the
defendant’s wrongdoing should be taken into account as well. When
a repeat wrongdoer compensates each victim for her probabilistic
harm, he ultimately pays the victims the right amount of
compensation. The same mechanism will work well in future-harm
cases when the defendant is a repeat wrongdoer.
Two additional objections against our proposal have more merit.
These objections help set the limits to our proposed liability regime.
One of those objections focuses on the magnitude of the risk of
illness. Sometimes, many people are exposed to a risk of illness, but
only a few of them actually become ill. Consider a polluter who
exposes 1,000,000 residents to a small risk of a serious illness.
Damage associated with that illness equals $1,000,000 and its
probability is 1:100,000 for each resident. That means that 10 out of
1,000,000 residents would suffer significant injury at some point in
the future. For obvious reasons, allowing each of 1,000,000 residents
to sue the polluter for his or her expected harm in the amount of $10
makes no sense. Small risks of future illness should not be
actionable.
We agree with this limitation to our proposal. Subject to this
limitation, however, whenever there is enough information for
evaluating victims’ expected harm, prospective victims should be
allowed to sue wrongdoers for risks of future illness.

C. The Problem of Collective Action
The remaining objection to our proposal identifies a serious problem
of collective action. Suppose that victims can choose between
immediate recovery for risks and future recovery for harms. For
reasons discussed earlier, some victims would prefer immediate
recovery. Their consumption of this remedy, however, will diminish
58
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the wrongdoers’ resources and increase the risk that the wrongdoers
would be unable to meet their obligations to victims who sue for
materialized harms. A similar problem troubled Justice Kennedy in
Ayres, who disagreed with a rule that allows recovery for fears of
contracting cancer in the future. Justice Kennedy’s reasons for
disagreeing with this rule included the prediction that fear-based
recovery of compensatory awards would exhaust the financial
resources that defendants could use for compensating asbestos
victims who actually develop cancer.60
But the problem at hand may be even more severe. If some potential
victims (Group A) sue the wrongdoer for their risks of future
illness—and they may have perfectly good reasons for filing those
suits—other potential victims (Group B), who originally preferred to
sue only in the event of illness, would find themselves in a different
position. The increased risk of the wrongdoer’s insolvency might
prompt some of those victims to sue immediately. This choice will
snowball: any additional suit—that is, any victim migration from
Group B to Group A—will further increase the risk of the
wrongdoer’s insolvency. As a result, none of the potential victims
would wait. All of them would migrate from Group B to Group A
and sue the wrongdoer immediately. As in the “Tragedy of the
Commons”, the ensuing flood of suits might exacerbate the
wrongdoer’s insolvency to the detriment of all victims.
This problem calls for a regulatory solution. One such solution is to
authorize courts to deal with the prospect of the wrongdoer’s
insolvency on a case-by-case basis. If this prospect is insignificant,
the court should allow the plaintiff to sue the defendant for the risk of
future illness. If the prospect is real, the court should stay the
proceeding and require the plaintiff to substitute her suit by a limitedfund class action. 61 Another solution is to set up a statutory fund to
which wrongdoers would have to contribute sums that equal the
amount of their victims’ expected harm (a Pigouvian tax). This
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solution is particularly suitable for cases involving recurrent
wrongdoers.

Conclusion
Probability-based compensation is a controversial remedy that
departs from the established legal tradition. This remedy is fairly
common, but still controversial, in the United States. Courts in
England and other jurisdictions use it on rare occasions.
Most cases in which this remedy was used—or could be used, if
courts did not feel reluctant about it—involved causally
indeterminate harm that the plaintiffs already sustained. Under such
circumstances, even a partial success of the plaintiff’s suit clashed
with conventional wisdom. This wisdom requires courts to dismiss as
unproven any suit that fails to satisfy the preponderance-of-theevidence requirement. An attempt to bypass this requirement by
awarding plaintiffs probability-based compensation consequently
becomes suspicious. This suspicion accounts for the tort systems’
widespread refusal to treat risk of future illness as actionable harm.
Another reason that explains this refusal is a general belief that future
harm, without more, is identical to bare risk—an actuarial, rather
than concrete, endangerment for which courts should impose no
liability.
This article questioned the validity of these two analogies. We hope
to have shown that these analogies are untidy, if not altogether
invalid. We also hope to have demonstrated that there are good
reasons for treating serious risks of future illness or injury as
actionable harm. If we are right, courts that persistently refused to
allow probabilistic recoveries in past-injury cases should reconsider
their position with regard to future harm.

